Evolutionary dynamics of compliance in a two-population game of auditors and taxpayers

DOI10.1016/J.CNSNS.2022.106945zbMATH Open1505.91078OpenAlexW4306407338MaRDI QIDQ2108702FDOQ2108702

Authors: Domenico De Giovanni, Fabio Lamantia, Mario Pezzino 

Publication date: 20 December 2022

Published in: Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cnsns.2022.106945

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zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary gamestax evasionsocial normsbriberyauditing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Mathematical economics (91B99) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences
• On the cultural transmission of corruption
• EFFICIENT NEIGHBORHOOD SEARCH FOR THE PROBABILISTIC MULTI-VEHICLE PICKUP AND DELIVERY PROBLEM
• On the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax evading agents
• A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)
• A note on the utility function under prospect theory
• Prospect theory and tax evasion: a reconsideration of the Yitzhaki puzzle
• Evolutionary tax evasion, prospect theory and heterogeneous taxpayers

Cited In (9)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Game modeling of collusion and influential factors under uniform taxpayer distribution
• Evolutionary tax evasion, prospect theory and heterogeneous taxpayers
• The evolutionary dynamics of audit
• On the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax evading agents
• Does cooperation in auditing matter? A comparison of a non-cooperative and a cooperative game model of auditing
• Taxation, Corruption and Punishment: Integrating Evolutionary Game into the Optimal Control of Government Policy
• The dynamics of corruption under an optional external supervision service
• A predator-prey economic system of tax evasion and corrupt behavior

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