Game modeling of collusion and influential factors under uniform taxpayer distribution

DOI10.3934/JDG.2023016MaRDI QIDQ6154317zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Salah Salimian, Mohammad Hadi Sobhanian

Publication date 15 February 2024

Published in Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2023016

zbMATH Keywords

collusiongame theorymodelingNash equilibriumtaxation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cites work

• A game theoretical model of interaction between taxpayers and the tax authority
• Corruption, evasion and environmental policy: a game theory approach
• Evolutionary dynamics of compliance in a two-population game of auditors and taxpayers
• Game theory and behavior
• Games and network structures on corruption, income inequality, and tax control
• Tax Authority and Taxpayers: How Does Mutual Collecting of Information Affect the Effectiveness of Tax Control

Cited in

(1)

• Salah-Mohammad triangular distribution curve is an alternative to the Laffer curve

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