Taxation, Corruption and Punishment: Integrating Evolutionary Game into the Optimal Control of Government Policy

DOI10.1142/S021919892050019XMaRDI QIDQ5013399zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Oliviero A. Carboni, Paolo Russu

Publication date 30 November 2021

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919892050019x

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicsoptimal controlbasin of attractioncorruption model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Applications of game theory (91A80) Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3991198 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2017728 (Why is no real title available?)
• A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption
• Equilibrium selection via replicator dynamics in \(2 \times 2\) coordination games
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolutionary tax evasion, prospect theory and heterogeneous taxpayers
• Inspection games with long-run inspectors
• Mathematical modeling and optimal control of corruption dynamics
• Modeling, dynamics, optimization and bioeconomics I. Contributions from ICMOD 2010, Porto, Portugal, and the 5th bioeconomy conference, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2012
• On the Transversality Condition in Infinite Horizon Optimal Problems
• On the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax evading agents
• Optimal Control of Nonlinear Processes
• The optimal control of Axelrod's social norm game

Cited in

(9)

• Optimal tax enforcement with imperfect tax payers and inspectors
• An optimization approach to the link between productivity, relocation cost and corruption
• Corruption, evasion and environmental policy: a game theory approach
• A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption
• Evolutionary dynamics of compliance in a two-population game of auditors and taxpayers
• Optimal administrative response to selfish behaviors in urban public management: the role of zero-determinant strategies
• Insights on tax evasion using a monetary circuit model
• A predator-prey economic system of tax evasion and corrupt behavior
• Games and network structures on corruption, income inequality, and tax control

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