Taxation, Corruption and Punishment: Integrating Evolutionary Game into the Optimal Control of Government Policy
DOI10.1142/S021919892050019XzbMATH Open1479.91217OpenAlexW3082696661MaRDI QIDQ5013399FDOQ5013399
Authors: Oliviero A. Carboni, Paolo Russu 
Publication date: 30 November 2021
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919892050019x
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Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Applications of game theory (91A80) Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Cites Work
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- Equilibrium selection via replicator dynamics in \(2 \times 2\) coordination games
- On the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax evading agents
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- A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption
- Inspection games with long-run inspectors
- Mathematical modeling and optimal control of corruption dynamics
- Modeling, dynamics, optimization and bioeconomics I. Contributions from ICMOD 2010, Porto, Portugal, and the 5th bioeconomy conference, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2012
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Cited In (9)
- Optimal tax enforcement with imperfect tax payers and inspectors
- An optimization approach to the link between productivity, relocation cost and corruption
- Corruption, evasion and environmental policy: a game theory approach
- A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption
- Evolutionary dynamics of compliance in a two-population game of auditors and taxpayers
- Optimal administrative response to selfish behaviors in urban public management: the role of zero-determinant strategies
- Insights on tax evasion using a monetary circuit model
- A predator-prey economic system of tax evasion and corrupt behavior
- Games and network structures on corruption, income inequality, and tax control
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