Optimal administrative response to selfish behaviors in urban public management: the role of zero-determinant strategies
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Publication:2051605
DOI10.1155/2021/1891679zbMath1477.91010OpenAlexW3205213249MaRDI QIDQ2051605
Publication date: 24 November 2021
Published in: Journal of Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/1891679
Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Cites Work
- Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
- A Stackelberg game management model of the urban public transport
- The Evolution of Cooperation
- Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
- A Real-Time Pricing Scheme with Advertisement Competition Based on Multi-Leader–Multi-Follower Game in Smart Community
- Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games
- From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
- The Logic of Animal Conflict
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
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