The environmental responsibility of firms and insurance coverage in an evolutionary game

DOI10.1007/S13235-022-00459-7MaRDI QIDQ6078096zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ilaria Colivicchi, Gianluca Iannucci

Publication date 27 September 2023

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00459-7

zbMATH Keywords

environmental damageenvironmental firms responsibilityevolutionary game dynamicsinsurance coverageoligopoly market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Actuarial mathematics (91G05)

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Cites work

• An evolutionary game model between governments and manufacturers considering carbon taxes, subsidies, and consumers' low-carbon preference
• An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation
• Bimatrix replicator dynamics with periodic impulses
• COVID-19 and stigma: evolution of self-restraint behavior
• Endogenous fluctuations under evolutionary pressure in Cournot competition
• Evolutionary competition in a mixed market with socially concerned firms
• Evolutionary substitution and replacement in \(N\)-species Lotka-Volterra systems
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5869530 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2017728 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• Sharing the cost of global warming
• The concept of a suitable insurance policy using leader-follower games
• The evolutionary game of pressure (or interference), resistance and collaboration

Cited in

(2)

• Insurance coverage and environmental risk in an evolutionary oligopoly
• Evolution of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma within changeable external environments

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