Hierarchical Model of Corruption: Game-Theoretic Approach

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_14MaRDI QIDQ5057964zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ivan M. Orlov, Suriya Sh. Kumacheva

Publication date 1 December 2022

Published in Trends in Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_14

zbMATH Keywords

briberycorruptioncorruption minimizing strategiesembezzlementequilibriahierarchical gameinspection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6300214 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mechanisms of struggle with corruption in dynamic social and private interests coordination engine models
• Price of anarchy and control mechanisms in models of concordance of public and private interests

Cited in

(19)

• Bribery games on interdependent complex networks
• Corruption driven by imitative behavior
• An optimization approach to the link between productivity, relocation cost and corruption
• Partners in crime? Corruption as a criminal network
• Static models of struggle against corruption in hierarchical management systems
• Game-theoretic model of corruption in hierarchic control systems
• Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: a theoretical approach
• Anticorruptional strategies analysis in the modified ``power-society model
• A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption
• An asymmetrical game analysis of corporate political activity
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2000127 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1842058 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the impact of corruption on managers' and controllers' behavior
• Two-stage game-theoretic model of inspection and embezzlement in a three-level control system
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5174762 (Why is no real title available?)
• Corruption, evasion and environmental policy: a game theory approach
• Event corruption: a game theoretic approach
• Dynamic models for coordinating private and public interests in economic corruption
• Corruption suppression models: the role of inspectors' moral level

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