Corruption driven by imitative behavior

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.04.092MaRDI QIDQ1925854zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Elvio Accinelli, Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera

Publication date 27 December 2012

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.092

zbMATH Keywords

corrupt behaviorevolutionary dynamicsimitative behaviorinstitutions and operations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Applications of game theory (91A80)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• Imitative behavior in a two-population model
• Which one should I imitate?
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits

Cited in

(9)

• Cultural transmission and extortion
• Political corruption and public activism: an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis
• Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption
• The power of voting and corruption cycles
• A predator-prey economic system of tax evasion and corrupt behavior
• Can the indifferent population affect the spread of rumors?
• Pure Nash equilibriums and independent dominating sets in evolutionary games on networks
• A model of corruption on higher-order networks with long-time quasi-stationary solutions
• Petty corruption

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