Imitative behavior in a two-population model
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Publication:5198531
DOI10.1007/978-0-8176-8089-3_14zbMATH Open1218.91022OpenAlexW155908164MaRDI QIDQ5198531FDOQ5198531
Authors: Elvio Accinelli, Juan Gabriel Brida, Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera 
Publication date: 8 August 2011
Published in: Advances in Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8089-3_14
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- Replicator based on imitation for finite and arbitrary networked communities
- Evolutionary matrix-game dynamics under imitation in heterogeneous populations
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