Imitative behavior in a two-population model

DOI10.1007/978-0-8176-8089-3_14MaRDI QIDQ5198531zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Elvio Accinelli, Juan Gabriel Brida, Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera

Publication date 8 August 2011

Published in Advances in Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8089-3_14

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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(19)

• Homophilic replicator equations
• Pure Nash equilibriums and independent dominating sets in evolutionary games on networks
• Effects of imitation in a competing and evolving population
• Corruption driven by imitative behavior
• Evolutionary minority games: the benefits of imitation
• The lower convergence tendency of imitators compared to best responders
• Mimicking behaviors in separated domains
• Continuous approximations of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Imitation in heterogeneous populations
• Evolution via imitation among like-minded individuals
• Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium
• Unbeatable imitation
• Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels
• Imitator strategies
• Imitation with asymmetric memory
• Replicator based on imitation for finite and arbitrary networked communities
• Evolutionary matrix-game dynamics under imitation in heterogeneous populations
• Imitation and the dynamics of norms
• An evolutionary model with best response and imitative rules

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