Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels
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Publication:472221
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.10.001zbMath1309.91022OpenAlexW2037176898MaRDI QIDQ472221
Publication date: 19 November 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.001
Related Items (4)
Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution ⋮ Multistability and Hopf bifurcation analysis for a three-strategy evolutionary game with environmental feedback and delay ⋮ Vaccinating behaviour guided by imitation and aspiration
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