Why learning doesn't add up: Equilibrium selection with a composition of learning rules

DOI10.1007/S00182-010-0265-3MaRDI QIDQ647353zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Russell Golman

Publication date 23 November 2011

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0265-3

zbMATH Keywords

learningreplicator dynamicsbasins of attractionequilibrium selectionevolutionary gamebest response dynamicsadjustment dynamicsimitate the best dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• A model of random matching
• Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Dynamical systems with a continuum of randomly matched agents
• Evolution in Bayesian games. I: Theory
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
• Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
• Fictitious play in 2 3 games
• Games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria: An experimental study
• Introduction to the theory of differential inclusions
• Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Social Stability and Equilibrium
• Stochastic Approximations and Differential Inclusions
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Time Average Replicator and Best-Reply Dynamics
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits

Cited in

(5)

• Heterogeneous society in binary choices with externalities
• Dynamics of large cooperative pulsed-coupled networks
• Task Complexity, Equilibrium Selection, and Learning: An Experimental Study
• Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels
• Multiple equilibria and selection by learning in an applied setting

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