Why learning doesn't add up: Equilibrium selection with a composition of learning rules
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Publication:647353
DOI10.1007/s00182-010-0265-3zbMath1233.91036OpenAlexW1965832289MaRDI QIDQ647353
Publication date: 23 November 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0265-3
learningreplicator dynamicsequilibrium selectionevolutionary gamebasins of attractionadjustment dynamicsbest response dynamicsimitate the best dynamics
Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (3)
Dynamics of large cooperative pulsed-coupled networks ⋮ Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels ⋮ Heterogeneous society in binary choices with externalities
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