Why learning doesn't add up: Equilibrium selection with a composition of learning rules
DOI10.1007/S00182-010-0265-3zbMATH Open1233.91036OpenAlexW1965832289MaRDI QIDQ647353FDOQ647353
Authors: Russell Golman 
Publication date: 23 November 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0265-3
Recommendations
learningreplicator dynamicsbasins of attractionequilibrium selectionevolutionary gamebest response dynamicsadjustment dynamicsimitate the best dynamics
Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Cites Work
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Cited In (5)
- Dynamics of large cooperative pulsed-coupled networks
- Task Complexity, Equilibrium Selection, and Learning: An Experimental Study
- Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels
- Multiple equilibria and selection by learning in an applied setting
- Heterogeneous society in binary choices with externalities
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