Interior Convergence Under Payoff Monotone Selections and Proper Equilibrium: Application to Equilibrium Selection
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Publication:2926598
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-02690-9_6zbMath1300.91013OpenAlexW1039042566MaRDI QIDQ2926598
Publication date: 31 October 2014
Published in: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02690-9_6
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