Tempered best response dynamics
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Publication:1742135
DOI10.1007/s00182-017-0575-9zbMath1391.91044OpenAlexW2208696203MaRDI QIDQ1742135
Publication date: 11 April 2018
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.cla.temple.edu/RePEc/documents/DETU_13_01.pdf
switching costspayoff monotonicityproper equilibriumstatus-quo biasbest response dynamicpiecewise differential equations
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Cites Work
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