Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
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Publication:1201142
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90040-OzbMath0773.90103OpenAlexW1995158831MaRDI QIDQ1201142
Publication date: 17 January 1993
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90040-o
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- Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games
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