Neighborhood size effects on the evolution of cooperation under myopic dynamics
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Cites work
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
- Impact of neighborhood separation on the spatial reciprocity in the prisoner's dilemma game
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- Selfishness, fraternity, and other-regarding preference in spatial evolutionary games
- The evolution of cooperation
- Third party interventions mitigate conflicts on interdependent networks
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