Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.01.003MaRDI QIDQ2636769zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Luciano Andreozzi

Publication date 18 February 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.003

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary stabilityfinite automatatrust game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Formal languages and automata (68Q45) Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

• Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
• Best response dynamics for role games
• Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences.
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Finite automata play a repeated extensive game
• In defense of DEFECT.
• Social Stability and Equilibrium
• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata

Cited in

(3)

• Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Emergence of trust in the trust game under best experienced payoff dynamics

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