Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata
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Publication:2636769
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.003zbMath1281.91024OpenAlexW2079218562MaRDI QIDQ2636769
Publication date: 18 February 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.003
Formal languages and automata (68Q45) Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Cites Work
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