Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.01.003zbMATH Open1281.91024OpenAlexW2079218562MaRDI QIDQ2636769FDOQ2636769

Luciano Andreozzi

Publication date: 18 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.003

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zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary stabilityfinite automatatrust game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Formal languages and automata (68Q45) Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
• Social Stability and Equilibrium
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Finite automata play a repeated extensive game
• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
• Best response dynamics for role games
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences.
• In defense of DEFECT.

Cited In (2)

• Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata

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