Learning in perturbed asymmetric games
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Cites work
- A note on best response dynamics.
- Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
- Conditional universal consistency.
- Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
- Evolutionary dynamics for bimatrix games: A Hamiltonian system?
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- Fictitious play property for games with identical interests
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48727 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3205074 (Why is no real title available?)
- Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results
- Learning dynamics in games with stochastic perturbations
- Learning mixed equilibria
- Learning purified mixed equilibria
- Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
- Learning, information, and sorting in market entry games: theory and evidence
- Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games
- Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements
- Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof
- On the convergence of fictitious play.
- On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
- Probabilistic choice and procedurally bounded rationality
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Social Stability and Equilibrium
- Three characterizations of population strategy stability
- Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games
Cited in
(42)- Reinforcement-based adaptive learning in asymmetric two-person bargaining with incomplete information
- On the asymptotic convergence to mixed equilibria in \(2\times 2\) asymmetric games
- Convergent multiple-timescales reinforcement learning algorithms in normal form games
- Bifurcation mechanism design -- from optimal flat taxes to better cancer treatments
- Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk-dove game
- Stable biased sampling
- Learning dynamics in games with stochastic perturbations
- Learning purified mixed equilibria
- Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
- Generalized perturbed best response dynamics with a continuum of strategies
- The evolution of function-valued traits for conditional cooperation
- Learning in games with unstable equilibria
- Convergence results on stochastic adaptive learning
- On the robustness of learning in games with stochastically perturbed payoff observations
- Evolution in Bayesian games. II: Stability of purified equilibria
- Learning, information, and sorting in market entry games: theory and evidence
- Equilibrium selection in games: the mollifier method
- Generalised weakened fictitious play
- Attainability of boundary points under reinforcement learning
- Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics
- An adjusted payoff-based procedure for normal form games
- Learning in mean field games: The fictitious play
- Stochastic fictitious play with continuous action sets
- Learning in games: Fictitious play dynamics
- Evolutionary game dynamics
- Evolution of mobility in predator-prey systems
- Evolutionary game theory
- Stability of learning dynamics in two-agent, imperfect-information games
- Passivity-based analysis and design for population dynamics with conformity biases
- Learning and equilibrium transitions: stochastic stability in discounted stochastic fictitious play
- Introspection dynamics in asymmetric multiplayer games
- AI-driven liquidity provision in OTC financial markets
- Testing the TASP: an experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria
- Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play
- The dynamic instability of dispersed price equilibria
- Quantal response equilibria with heterogeneous agents
- Perturbed Bayesian best response dynamic in continuum games
- Regularized Bayesian best response learning in finite games
- Algorithmic collusion and a Folk theorem from learning with bounded rationality
- Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements
- Learning across games
- Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs
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