Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:625038)
Recommendations
- On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
- Fictitious play in zero-sum stochastic games
- On the convergence of beliefs within populations in games with learning
- Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
- Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations
Cites work
- A general class of adaptive strategies
- A note on best response dynamics.
- A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
- A Stochastic Approximation Method
- Attainability of boundary points under reinforcement learning
- Consistency and cautious fictitious play
- Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
- Do stochastic algorithms avoid traps?
- Evolution in Bayesian games. I: Theory
- Evolution in Bayesian games. II: Stability of purified equilibria
- Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3616736 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1405930 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3205074 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3069635 (Why is no real title available?)
- Learning from Neighbours
- Learning from personal experience: One rational gay and the justification of myopia
- Learning in perturbed asymmetric games
- Learning mixed equilibria
- Learning purified mixed equilibria
- Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
- Learning, matching, and aggregation
- Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games
- Nonconvergence to unstable points in urn models and stochastic approximations
- On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
- On the uniform consistency of Bayes estimates for multinomial probabilities
- Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions
- Pièges répulsifs
- Random matching in adaptive dynamics
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Some Pathological Traps for Stochastic Approximation
- Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
- Stochastic Estimation of the Maximum of a Regression Function
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Theories of Learning in Games and Heterogeneity Bias
- Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
- Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games
Cited in
(12)- Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
- Adaptive learning in large populations
- Learning in games with unstable equilibria
- Convergence results on stochastic adaptive learning
- Reinforcement learning in population games
- The dynamics of generalized reinforcement learning
- Evolution of theories of mind
- On learning dynamics underlying the evolution of learning rules
- Learning in Games
- The dynamic instability of dispersed price equilibria
- Stochastic adaptive learning with committed players in games with strict Nash equilibria
- Fast convergence in evolutionary models: a Lyapunov approach
This page was built for publication: Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q625038)
