Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games

DOI10.1006/game.1999.0717zbMath1002.91005OpenAlexW2169225433WikidataQ99980051 ScholiaQ99980051MaRDI QIDQ1818284

Morris W. Hirsch, Michel Benaïm

Publication date: 1 February 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0717

zbMATH Keywords

infinitely repeated, randomly perturbed gamesJordan's \(3\times 2\) matching gameNash distribution equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Matching models (91B68)

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