An adaptive learning model with foregone payoff information
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Publication:1674985
DOI10.1515/bejte-2013-0043zbMath1375.91054OpenAlexW2038675652MaRDI QIDQ1674985
Publication date: 26 October 2017
Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2013-0043
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