Stochastic fictitious play with continuous action sets

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.008zbMath1297.91010OpenAlexW1971021761MaRDI QIDQ403729

Steven Perkins, David S. Leslie

Publication date: 29 August 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.008

zbMATH Keywords

learning in gamesabstract stochastic approximationcontinuous action set gamesstochastic fictitious play

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Generalized perturbed best response dynamics with a continuum of strategies ⋮ Competition with high number of agents and a major one ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ An evolutionary approach to pollution control in competitive markets ⋮ Evolutionary implementation in a public goods game ⋮ Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation ⋮ Pairwise comparison dynamics for games with continuous strategy space ⋮ The logit dynamic in supermodular games with a continuum of strategies: a deterministic approximation approach ⋮ On the evolution of continuous types under replicator and gradient dynamics: two examples ⋮ Evolutionary implementation in aggregative games ⋮ Elimination of non-individualistic preferences in large population aggregative games ⋮ The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets

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