Stochastic fictitious play with continuous action sets
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Cites work
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- Abstract stochastic approximations and applications
- An invariance principle for the Robbins-Monro process in a Hilbert space
- Analysis of recursive stochastic algorithms
- Asymptotic Properties of Distributed and Communicating Stochastic Approximation Algorithms
- Asymptotic behaviour of a class of stochastic approximation procedures
- Asynchronous Stochastic Approximations
- Best response dynamics for continuous zero-sum games
- Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics: The continuous strategy case
- Convergence of Baire measures
- Convergence of the Robbins-Monro method for linear problems in a Banach space
- Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces
- Fréchet differentiability of Lipschitz functions and porous sets in Banach spaces
- Learning in perturbed asymmetric games
- Learning mixed equilibria
- Learning purified mixed equilibria
- Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
- Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games
- Nonparametric adaptive learning with feedback
- On stochastic convolution in banach spaces and applications
- On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
- On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models.
- Rate of convergence of stochastic approximation procedures in a Banach space
- Robust Statistics
- Stability of the replicator equation for a single species with a multi-dimensional continuous trait space
- Stability of the replicator equation with continuous strategy space
- Stochastic Approximations and Differential Inclusions
- Stochastic approximation algorithms for parallel and distributed processing
- Stochastic approximation methods for constrained and unconstrained systems
- Stochastic approximation with two time scales
- The Kolmogorov-Riesz compactness theorem
- The averaged Robbins-Monro method for linear problems in a Banach space
Cited in
(20)- Fictitious play for continuous games
- Generalized perturbed best response dynamics with a continuum of strategies
- The logit dynamic in supermodular games with a continuum of strategies: a deterministic approximation approach
- Fictitious play in zero-sum stochastic games
- Perturbed Bayesian best response dynamic in continuum games
- Asymmetric replicator dynamics on Polish spaces: invariance, stability, and convergence
- Learning with minimal information in continuous games
- An evolutionary approach to pollution control in competitive markets
- Fictitious play in stochastic games
- Pairwise comparison dynamics for games with continuous strategy space
- Regularized Bayesian best response learning in finite games
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation
- Evolutionary implementation in aggregative games
- Evolutionary implementation in a public goods game
- Learning in nonatomic games. I: Finite action spaces and population games
- Elimination of non-individualistic preferences in large population aggregative games
- On the evolution of continuous types under replicator and gradient dynamics: two examples
- Competition with high number of agents and a major one
- The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets
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