Evolutionary implementation in a public goods game

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2019.03.009MaRDI QIDQ2415999zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Ratul Lahkar, Saptarshi Mukherjee

Publication date 23 May 2019

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.009

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicspotential gamesbudget balanceexternalitiespublic goodsVCG mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Evolutionary implementation in aggregative games
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Cites work

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• Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation
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• The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets
• Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical

Cited in

(18)

• Evolutionary dynamics in public good games
• Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation
• Dominant strategy implementation in a large population public goods game
• Elimination of non-individualistic preferences in large population aggregative games
• Evolution in mechanisms for public projects
• Effects of enhancement level on evolutionary public goods game with payoff aspirations
• Generalized perturbed best response dynamics with a continuum of strategies
• Evolutionary inspection and corruption games
• Replicator dynamics of the hawk-dove game with different stochastic noises in infinite populations
• An evolutionary approach to pollution control in competitive markets
• Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics
• Survival of altruistic preferences in a large population public goods game
• Evolutionary implementation in aggregative games
• Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation
• Career choice as an extended spatial evolutionary public goods game
• Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation
• Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing
• The logit dynamic in supermodular games with a continuum of strategies: a deterministic approximation approach

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