Self-Confirming Equilibrium
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- On equilibria in games with imperfect recall
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- Resource prices and planning horizons
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- Perception games and privacy
- Macroeconomic uncertainty prices when beliefs are tenuous
- Asymptotic behavior of Bayesian learners with misspecified models
- The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension
- Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness
- Cultural transmission with incomplete information
- Social learning in nonatomic routing games
- Knowledge, awareness and probabilistic beliefs
- The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games
- A framework for the analysis of self-confirming policies
- An epistemic characterization of MACA
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- A semi-potential for finite and infinite games in extensive form
- Cheap talk with coarse understanding
- Framing and repeated competition
- Extensive games with possibly unaware players
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- A game-free microfoundation of mutual optimism
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- A theory of perceived discrimination
- Redefinition of belief distorted Nash equilibria for the environment of dynamic games with probabilistic beliefs
- Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games
- Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency
- Imperfect monitoring in communication networks
- Inductive game theory: a basic scenario
- Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation
- Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique
- Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games
- The analogical foundations of cooperation
- Belief and truth in hypothesised behaviours
- Maximization, learning, and economic behavior
- Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
- Self-confirming games: unawareness, discovery, and equilibrium
- Belief distorted Nash equilibria: introduction of a new kind of equilibrium in dynamic games with distorted information
- Strongly Consistent Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium
- Paying attention to payoffs in analogy-based learning
- Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium
- LEARNING TO PLAY BEST RESPONSE IN DUOPOLY GAMES
- Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium
- Ellsberg games
- Building Social Networks Under Consent: A Survey
- Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
- Learning in Games
- Correlated-belief equilibrium
- Honesty and informal agreements
- On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information
- Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
- Justifiable preferences
- LEARNING TO FORECAST AND CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF OUTPUT AND INFLATION
- Introduction to incompleteness and uncertainty in economics
- Internal rationality, imperfect market knowledge and asset prices
- Dynamic learning in a two-person experimental game
- Learning and selfconfirming equilibria in network games
- Rational play in extensive-form games
- On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust
- Conjectures and underpricing in repeated mass disputes with heterogeneous plaintiffs
- Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions
- Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play
- Information flows and memory in games
- Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
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