Inductive game theory: a basic scenario

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.07.009zbMath1156.91012MaRDI QIDQ2519062

Mamoru Kaneko, Jeffrey Jude Kline

Publication date: 22 January 2009

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2008.07.009

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrium; induction; memory function; extensive game; experience; experiential foundation; information piece

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory

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