Learning to play Bayesian games.
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Cites work
- A simple model of voice
- An experiment to evaluate Bayesian learning of Nash equilibrium play
- Bayesian learning in repeated games
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
- Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
- Rational Debate and One-Dimensional Conflict*
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: Between Nash and rationalizability
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Social learning in recurring games
- Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics
- Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
Cited in
(36)- Categorizing others in a large game
- The partially cursed and the analogy-based expectation equilibrium
- Learning with perfect information.
- Interval-valued cores and interval-valued dominance cores of cooperative games endowed with interval-valued payoffs
- Autonomous agents modelling other agents: a comprehensive survey and open problems
- Learning in general games with Nature's moves
- Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
- Strategic learning in games with symmetric information.
- Learning a population distribution
- Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
- Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games
- Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
- Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique
- Belief and truth in hypothesised behaviours
- Games with incomplete information when players are partially aware of others' signals
- Adversarial Scheduling Analysis of Game-Theoretic Models of Norm Diffusion
- Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1189219 (Why is no real title available?)
- Paying attention to payoffs in analogy-based learning
- LEARNING IN BAYESIAN GAMES BY BOUNDED RATIONAL PLAYERS I.
- Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
- Maximizing survival time in a random walk on an interval
- Learning implicit information in Bayesian games with knowledge transfer
- On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information
- A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games
- An experiment to evaluate Bayesian learning of Nash equilibrium play
- Conjectures and underpricing in repeated mass disputes with heterogeneous plaintiffs
- Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions
- Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Signaling without a common prior: results on experimental equilibrium selection
- Rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium in static games with unawareness
- Proxy variables and feedback effects in decision making
- Learning across games
- Games with incomplete information and uncertain payoff: from the perspective of uncertainty theory
- Robust equilibria under non-common priors
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