An experiment to evaluate Bayesian learning of Nash equilibrium play
The authors report on an experiment designed to evaluate the empirical implications of Jordan's model of Bayesian learning in games of incomplete information. A finite example is constructed. When the ``true game defined by players' private information was one with a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, the experimental subjects' play converged to the equilibrium, even when the subjects had not attained complete information about one another. But when there were two pure strategy equilibria, the theory's predictions were not consistent with the observed behaviour.
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