Suboptimality of M-step back strategies in Bayesian games

DOI10.1007/BF01240252MaRDI QIDQ1196703zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stephen C. Young, Jim Q. Smith

Publication date 16 January 1993

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240252

zbMATH Keywords

calibrationprisoner's dilemmastochastic gamesBayesian gamesBayesian rationalityBayes optimal strategyrepeated two player games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614533 (Why is no real title available?)
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Deriving and Analysing Optimal Strategies in Bayesian Models of Games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Subjective Probability and the Prisoner's Dilemma

Cited in

(2)

• Deriving and Analysing Optimal Strategies in Bayesian Models of Games
• Object-oriented Bayesian networks for a decision support system for antitrust enforcement

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