Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations: accuracy of prediction on randomly selected constant sum games
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Publication:2642891
DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0214-yzbMath1121.91329OpenAlexW2140944921MaRDI QIDQ2642891
Robert L. Slonim, Alvin E. Roth, Ido Erev, Greg Barron
Publication date: 6 September 2007
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0214-y
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