Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations: accuracy of prediction on randomly selected constant sum games

DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0214-YzbMATH Open1121.91329OpenAlexW2140944921MaRDI QIDQ2642891FDOQ2642891

Authors: Ido Erev, Alvin E. Roth, Robert L. Slonim, Greg Barron 

Publication date: 6 September 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0214-y

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

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Cited In (11)

• A choice prediction competition for social preferences in simple extensive form games: an introduction
• An introduction to the Symposium on behavioral game theory
• Online calibrated forecasts: memory efficiency versus universality for learning in games
• Paying attention to payoffs in analogy-based learning
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A unifying learning framework for building artificial game-playing agents
• Multi-agent learning and the descriptive value of simple models
• Behavioural simulations in spot electricity markets
• Averaged predictions and the learning of equilibrium play
• Learning, risk attitude and hot stoves in restless bandit problems
• Optimal selection of sample-size dependent common subsets of covariates for multi-task regression prediction

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