Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments
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Publication:2502339
DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0633-6zbMath1118.91018OpenAlexW2072912727MaRDI QIDQ2502339
Jim Engle-Warnick, Robert L. Slonim
Publication date: 12 September 2006
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Economics/papers/2001/w13/autfinal4.pdf
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