Perceptron versus automaton in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
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- Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Bounded rationality, neural network and folk theorem in repeated games with discounting
- Bounded versus unbounded rationality: The tyranny of the weak
- Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
- Finitely repeated games with finite automata
- How complex are networks playing repeated games?
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4202070 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3777289 (Why is no real title available?)
- Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments
- Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
- On the complexity of repeated principal agent games
- Perceptrons play repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Perceptrons play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- The evolution of cooperation
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
- Two-person repeated games with finite automata
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