Learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:817269
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.009zbMath1129.91009MaRDI QIDQ817269
Robert L. Slonim, Jim Engle-Warnick
Publication date: 8 March 2006
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.009
91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
91A90: Experimental studies
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Cites Work
- Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results
- Trust, reciprocity, and social history: A re-examination
- Trust, reciprocity, and social history
- Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
- Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments
- Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
