Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
- A learning approach to auctions
- Adaptive Heuristics
- Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science
- Evolution in Bayesian games. I: Theory
- Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
- Evolutionary stability in first price auctions
- Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. II: \(2 \times 2\) games
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- Minimax-regret strategies for bargaining over several variables
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- The Evolution of Conventions
- The Theory of Statistical Decision
- The evolution of conventions under incomplete information
Cited in
(8)- Ex post regret and the decentralized sharing of information
- An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games
- Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-k comparison
- Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. II: \(2 \times 2\) games
- Does regret matter in first-price auctions?
- Two ``little treasure games driven by unconditional regret
- Merger negotiations and ex-post regret
- Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: an indirect evolutionary analysis
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