Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. II: 2 2 games

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2014.06.004MaRDI QIDQ462864zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rene Saran, Roberto Serrano

Publication date 22 October 2014

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.06.004

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete information\(2\times 2\) gamesBayesian equilibriumex-post regret heuristicsminimax regret equilibriumquasi-supermodular games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• A course in game theory.
• Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
• Game theory
• Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction

Cited in

(4)

• Existence and stability of minimax regret equilibria
• Market Exit and Minimax Regret
• Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-\(k\) comparison
• Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching

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