The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

DOI10.1007/S00199-003-0460-6MaRDI QIDQ1780164zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mogens Jense, Hans Jørgen Whitta-Jacobsen, Birgitte Sloth

Publication date 7 June 2005

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1340.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian gamesChickenConventionsEvolutionStatic games of incomplete information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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• Competing conventions with costly information acquisition
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• Evolutionary learning in signalling games
• Backward unraveling over time: The evolution of strategic behavior in the entry level British medical labor markets
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms

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