The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

DOI10.1007/S00199-003-0460-6zbMATH Open1114.91020OpenAlexW2745291807MaRDI QIDQ1780164FDOQ1780164

Authors: Mogens Jense, Hans Jørgen Whitta-Jacobsen, Birgitte Sloth 

Publication date: 7 June 2005

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1340.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian gamesEvolutionChickenConventionsStatic games of incomplete information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cited In (7)

• The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• Evolutionary learning in signalling games
• Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
• Competing conventions with costly information acquisition
• Backward unraveling over time: The evolution of strategic behavior in the entry level British medical labor markets
• On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information

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