The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information

DOI10.1007/3-540-28161-4_15MaRDI QIDQ5432005zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Birgitte Sloth, Hans Jørgen Whitta-Jacobsen, Mogens H. Jensen

Publication date 2 January 2008

Published in Institutions, Equilibria and Efficiency (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1340.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• The evolution of conventions under incomplete information
• Evolutionary learning in signalling games
• On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection

Cited in

(4)

• Competing conventions with costly information acquisition
• Evolutionary learning in signalling games
• On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information
• The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

This page was built for publication: The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5432005)