The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information

DOI10.1007/3-540-28161-4_15zbMATH Open1130.91308OpenAlexW2067071744MaRDI QIDQ5432005FDOQ5432005

Authors: Birgitte Sloth, Hans Jørgen Whitta-Jacobsen, Mogens H. Jensen 

Publication date: 2 January 2008

Published in: Institutions, Equilibria and Efficiency (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1340.pdf

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cited In (4)

• Evolutionary learning in signalling games
• Competing conventions with costly information acquisition
• The evolution of conventions under incomplete information
• On the stability of evolutionary dynamics in games with incomplete information

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