Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: an indirect evolutionary analysis

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.05.027zbMath1364.91064OpenAlexW2101823714MaRDI QIDQ529795

Paul Pezanis-Christou, Güth, Werner

Publication date: 9 June 2017

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.027

zbMATH Keywords

indirect evolutionevolutionarily stable strategyindependent private valuesfirst-price auctionsymmetric risk neutral equilibrium bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
• A new justification of monopolistic competition
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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