Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: an indirect evolutionary analysis

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.05.027zbMATH Open1364.91064OpenAlexW2101823714MaRDI QIDQ529795FDOQ529795

Authors: Paul Pezanis-Christou, Werner Güth 

Publication date: 9 June 2017

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.027

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zbMATH Keywords

evolutionarily stable strategyindependent private valuesfirst-price auctionindirect evolutionsymmetric risk neutral equilibrium bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
• A new justification of monopolistic competition

Cited In (2)

• Evolutionary justifications for non-Bayesian beliefs
• An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games

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