Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: an indirect evolutionary analysis

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.05.027MaRDI QIDQ529795zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paul Pezanis-Christou, Werner Güth

Publication date 9 June 2017

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.027

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionarily stable strategyindependent private valuesfirst-price auctionindirect evolutionsymmetric risk neutral equilibrium bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• A new justification of monopolistic competition
• Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

Cited in

(2)

• Evolutionary justifications for non-Bayesian beliefs
• An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games

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