Naive bidding

DOI10.1287/MNSC.1040.0330MaRDI QIDQ3115451zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors George Deltas, Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

Publication date 21 February 2012

Published in Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0330

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitycommon value auctionsbidding winner's curse

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Auctions with an inexpert bidder
• Simulating auctions
• Evolutionary stability in first price auctions
• Learning to bid: the design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation
• Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction

Cited in

(7)

• Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
• Auctions with an inexpert bidder
• Optimal bidding in auctions of mixed populations of bidders
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• The sunk-cost fallacy in penny auctions
• Fishing for fools
• Believing in correlated types in spite of independence: an indirect evolutionary analysis

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