Auctions with an inexpert bidder
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Publication:5941472
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00463-3zbMath0983.91022WikidataQ126297493 ScholiaQ126297493MaRDI QIDQ5941472
Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, George George Deltas
Publication date: 20 August 2001
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Limit orders, asymmetric information, and the formation of asset prices with a computerized specialist
- Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
- Competitive bidding and proprietary information
- Population uncertainty and Poisson games
- A simple model of expert and non-expert bidding in first-price auctions
- Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price
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