A simple model of expert and non-expert bidding in first-price auctions

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0101MaRDI QIDQ2365341zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michele Piccione, Guofu Tan

Publication date 23 February 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/66a39e33d21e516dfb2b9b5ad9ca414f2eca7884

zbMATH Keywords

first-price sealed-bid auctionequilibrium bidding behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Auctions with Opportunistic Experts
• Auctions with an inexpert bidder
• Competition and information acquisition in first price auctions
• Bidding in a possibly common-value auction

Cited in

(8)

• Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price
• Unraveling in first-price auction.
• On dynamic games with randomly arriving players
• Auctions with an inexpert bidder
• Professional advice
• Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
• Knowing your opponents: information disclosure and auction design
• Auctions with Opportunistic Experts

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