Unraveling in first-price auction.
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1399519
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00003-4zbMath1040.91041MaRDI QIDQ1399519
Publication date: 30 July 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
information revelation; due skepticism; First-price auction; incentive to disclose at the top; random bidders
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
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- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
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- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding