Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4319568
DOI10.2307/2951754zbMath0816.90047OpenAlexW3123492928MaRDI QIDQ4319568
Robert H. Porter, Kenneth Hendricks, Charles A. Wilson
Publication date: 11 January 1995
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951754
Related Items (16)
Information revelation in auctions ⋮ A correction to uniqueness in ``Competitive bidding and proprietary information ⋮ How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations? ⋮ Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts ⋮ Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information ⋮ Partnership dissolution and proprietary information ⋮ Nonparametric identification of an interdependent value model with buyer covariates from first-price auction bids ⋮ An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: the blessed winner ⋮ Auctions with an inexpert bidder ⋮ Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment ⋮ Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions ⋮ Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions ⋮ Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions? ⋮ Commission strategy of the auction house ⋮ Commission strategy of the auction house ⋮ An asymptotic solution for sealed bid common-value auctions with bidders having asymmetric information
This page was built for publication: Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price
