Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price

DOI10.2307/2951754zbMath0816.90047MaRDI QIDQ4319568

Robert H. Porter, Kenneth Hendricks, Charles A. Wilson

Publication date: 11 January 1995

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951754

zbMATH Keywords

auctions; affiliation; first-price, sealed bid auction; random reservation price

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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