Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games
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Publication:2416629
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 232878 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity
- A course in game theory.
- A note on comparative ambiguity aversion and justifiability
- Ambiguity and robust statistics
- Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
- Dynamic choice under ambiguity
- Ellsberg games
- Extensive form games with uncertainty averse players
- Game theory
- If You're so Smart, why Aren't You Rich? Belief Selection in Complete and Incomplete Markets
- Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
- Learning Under Ambiguity
- Learning and self-confirming long-run biases
- Learning to play Bayesian games.
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium
- Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
- Subjective games and equilibria
- Updating Ambiguity Averse Preferences
Cited in
(7)- Games under ambiguous payoffs and optimistic attitudes
- Learning and self-confirming long-run biases
- Game-theoretic modeling of players' ambiguities on external factors
- Information flows and memory in games
- Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors
- Other-regarding preference causing ping-pong effect in self-questioning game
- Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
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