Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.02.005zbMATH Open1411.91069OpenAlexW2912953280WikidataQ128416968 ScholiaQ128416968MaRDI QIDQ2416629FDOQ2416629

Authors: Yanyan Li 

Publication date: 24 May 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:607

Recommendations

• Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors
• Ambiguous act equilibria
• Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players

zbMATH Keywords

smooth ambiguityself-confirming equilibriumsequential games with feedback

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Game theory
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity
• Dynamic choice under ambiguity
• A course in game theory.
• Learning Under Ambiguity
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Learning to play Bayesian games.
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• If You're so Smart, why Aren't You Rich? Belief Selection in Complete and Incomplete Markets
• Extensive form games with uncertainty averse players
• Subjective games and equilibria
• Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
• Ellsberg games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Updating Ambiguity Averse Preferences
• Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
• Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium
• Ambiguity and robust statistics
• A note on comparative ambiguity aversion and justifiability
• Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
• Learning and self-confirming long-run biases

Cited In (7)

• Information flows and memory in games
• Game-theoretic modeling of players' ambiguities on external factors
• Learning and self-confirming long-run biases
• Other-regarding preference causing ping-pong effect in self-questioning game
• Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors
• Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
• Games under ambiguous payoffs and optimistic attitudes

This page was built for publication: Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2416629)