Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2016.07.002MaRDI QIDQ504397zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pierpaolo Battigalli, Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci

Publication date 16 January 2017

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:459

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguity aversionconjectural equilibriuminformation feedbackpartially specified probabilitiesselfconfirming equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 232878 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3061365 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty
• Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
• Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• On general minimax theorems
• On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information
• Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
• Structural consistency and strategic independence in extensive games
• Subjective games and equilibria
• The work of John Nash in game theory. Nobel seminar, December 8, 1994

Cited in

(14)

• Risk attitudes in axiomatic decision theory: a conceptual perspective
• Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games
• New results on the existence of open loop Nash equilibria in discrete time dynamic games via generalized Nash games
• Optimism and pessimism in games
• Ellsberg games
• Feedback design in games with ambiguity-averse players
• Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium
• A framework for the analysis of self-confirming policies
• Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
• Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique
• Comparing uncertainty aversion towards different sources
• General Luce model
• Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
• Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty

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