Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2016.07.002zbMATH Open1368.91025OpenAlexW2227939299MaRDI QIDQ504397FDOQ504397

Pierpaolo Battigalli, Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Massimo Marinacci, Fabio Maccheroni

Publication date: 16 January 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:459

Recommendations

• Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
• Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Learning and self-confirming long-run biases
• Strongly Consistent Self-Confirming Equilibrium

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguity aversionconjectural equilibriuminformation feedbackpartially specified probabilitiesselfconfirming equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
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• On general minimax theorems
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty
• Subjective games and equilibria
• On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information
• Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
• The work of John Nash in game theory. Nobel seminar, December 8, 1994
• Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium
• Structural consistency and strategic independence in extensive games

Cited In (13)

• Risk attitudes in axiomatic decision theory: a conceptual perspective
• Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games
• New results on the existence of open loop Nash equilibria in discrete time dynamic games via generalized Nash games
• Ellsberg games
• Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium
• A framework for the analysis of self-confirming policies
• Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
• Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique
• Comparing uncertainty aversion towards different sources
• General Luce model
• Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
• OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM IN GAMES
• Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty

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