Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
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Publication:1890909
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991 (Why is no real title available?)
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- Learning mixed equilibria
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: Between Nash and rationalizability
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
- Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
Cited in
(38)- Learning with perfect information.
- Economists' models of learning
- Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium
- Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
- Fictitious play in zero-sum stochastic games
- Learning and self-confirming long-run biases
- On self-enforcement in extensive-form games
- Analyzing behavior implied by EWA learning: an emphasis on distinguishing reinforcement from belief learning
- On learning to cooperate.
- Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
- Information in Continuous Time Decision Models with Many Agents
- Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium
- Paying attention to payoffs in analogy-based learning
- Learning a population distribution
- Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation
- Learning and selfconfirming equilibria in network games
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- Social learning in recurring games
- Learning across games
- Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium
- Learning to learn, pattern recognition, and Nash equilibrium
- Predicting human cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma using case-based decision theory
- The partially cursed and the analogy-based expectation equilibrium
- Securing infrastructure facilities: when does proactive defense help?
- Games with incomplete information when players are partially aware of others' signals
- Learning equilibrium play: A myopic approach
- Self-confirming games: unawareness, discovery, and equilibrium
- Mutually acceptable courses of action
- Learning from personal experience: One rational gay and the justification of myopia
- Rule evolution and equilibrium selection
- Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness
- Cultural transmission with incomplete information
- Learning equilibrium as a generalization of learning to optimize
- Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique
- Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
- Learning to play Bayesian games.
- Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
- Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models
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