Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
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Publication:1890909
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80016-8zbMATH Open0827.90144OpenAlexW2149152713MaRDI QIDQ1890909FDOQ1890909
Authors: Drew Fudenberg, David M. Kreps 
Publication date: 13 December 1995
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80016-8
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Cites Work
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- Learning mixed equilibria
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: Between Nash and rationalizability
- Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
Cited In (37)
- Predicting human cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma using case-based decision theory
- Learning and selfconfirming equilibria in network games
- On learning to cooperate.
- Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium
- Paying attention to payoffs in analogy-based learning
- Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium
- Social learning in recurring games
- Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
- The partially cursed and the analogy-based expectation equilibrium
- Securing infrastructure facilities: when does proactive defense help?
- Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- Games with incomplete information when players are partially aware of others' signals
- Learning to play Bayesian games.
- Learning a population distribution
- Learning across games
- Learning and self-confirming long-run biases
- Learning to learn, pattern recognition, and Nash equilibrium
- Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique
- Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation
- Mutually acceptable courses of action
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Information in Continuous Time Decision Models with Many Agents
- Learning with perfect information.
- Learning equilibrium play: A myopic approach
- Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models
- Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium
- Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
- Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness
- Cultural transmission with incomplete information
- On self-enforcement in extensive-form games
- Analyzing behavior implied by EWA learning: an emphasis on distinguishing reinforcement from belief learning
- Fictitious Play in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games
- Learning from personal experience: One rational gay and the justification of myopia
- Economists' models of learning
- Rule evolution and equilibrium selection
- Learning equilibrium as a generalization of learning to optimize
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