Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80016-8zbMath0827.90144OpenAlexW2149152713MaRDI QIDQ1890909

David M. Kreps, Drew Fudenberg

Publication date: 13 December 1995

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80016-8

zbMATH Keywords

learning processesextensive-form gameself-confirming equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Learning mixed equilibria
• Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: Between Nash and rationalizability
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium

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