Self-confirming games: unawareness, discovery, and equilibrium
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Publication:3384087
zbMATH Open1484.91067arXiv1707.08761MaRDI QIDQ3384087FDOQ3384087
Authors: Burkhard C. Schipper 
Publication date: 14 December 2021
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.08761
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Cites Work
- Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
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- On non-Nash equilibria
- Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
- Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction
- Generalized Nash equilibrium with stable belief hierarchies in static games with unawareness
- Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
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