Self-confirming games: unawareness, discovery, and equilibrium
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Publication:3384087
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Cites work
- Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection
- Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
- Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior
- Extensive games with possibly unaware players
- Generalized Nash equilibrium with stable belief hierarchies in static games with unawareness
- Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players
- Inductive reasoning about unawareness
- Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
- Mutually acceptable courses of action
- On non-Nash equilibria
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: Between Nash and rationalizability
- Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: a framework for robust predictions
- Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium
- Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
- Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction
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