Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction

DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2866zbMATH Open1015.91009OpenAlexW2115121421MaRDI QIDQ697965FDOQ697965

Eddie Dekel, David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg

Publication date: 18 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3200611

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zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilityextensive-form gamesself-confirming equilibriumsubjective uncertaintybehavior strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
• Sequential Equilibria
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria
• Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium

Cited In (18)

• Characterizing the Strategic Impact of Misspecified Beliefs
• An epistemic characterization of MACA
• Common belief in future and restricted past rationality
• Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
• Belief in the opponents' future rationality
• Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
• Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning
• Attitudes toward uncertainty and randomization: an experimental study
• Mutually acceptable courses of action
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning
• The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension
• Rational play in extensive-form games
• Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness
• Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency
• On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets
• State estimation bias induced by optimization under uncertainty and error cost asymmetry is likely reflected in perception
• Should I play or should I go? Individuals' characteristics and preference for uncertainty

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