Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2866zbMath1015.91009OpenAlexW2115121421MaRDI QIDQ697965

Eddie Dekel, David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg

Publication date: 18 September 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3200611

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilityself-confirming equilibriumextensive-form gamessubjective uncertaintybehavior strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items

Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning, An epistemic characterization of MACA, On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets, Rational play in extensive-form games, Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox, Belief in the opponents' future rationality, Unnamed Item, Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency, Common belief in future and restricted past rationality, Mutually acceptable courses of action, The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension, Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness, Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games, Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning

Cites Work

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• Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria
• Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
• Sequential Equilibria