Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction

DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2866MaRDI QIDQ697965zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine

Publication date 18 September 2002

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3200611

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilityextensive-form gamesself-confirming equilibriumsubjective uncertaintybehavior strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Recommendations

• Correlated equilibrium under uncertainty
• "Beliefs about Beliefs" without Probabilities
• Equilibrium in beliefs under uncertainty
• Strategic games beyond expected utility
• Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty

Cites work

• Game theory
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
• Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Sequential Equilibria
• Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria

Cited in

(18)

• Characterizing the Strategic Impact of Misspecified Beliefs
• An epistemic characterization of MACA
• Common belief in future and restricted past rationality
• Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
• Belief in the opponents' future rationality
• Attitudes toward uncertainty and randomization: an experimental study
• Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning
• Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
• Mutually acceptable courses of action
• Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning
• The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension
• Rational play in extensive-form games
• Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness
• Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency
• On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets
• State estimation bias induced by optimization under uncertainty and error cost asymmetry is likely reflected in perception
• Self-confirming games: unawareness, discovery, and equilibrium
• Should I play or should I go? Individuals' characteristics and preference for uncertainty

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