Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty
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Publication:893394
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.08.009zbMATH Open1369.91009OpenAlexW1820309713MaRDI QIDQ893394FDOQ893394
Authors: Mira Frick, Assaf Romm 
Publication date: 19 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.009
Recommendations
robustnessrationalityincomplete informationadmissibilityapproximate common certaintycommon \(p\)-belief
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Admissibility in Games
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
- On \(p\)-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality
- Proper rationalizability and backward induction
- Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
Cited In (9)
- Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria
- Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
- Interim partially correlated rationalizability
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Optimal irrational behavior in continuous time
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
- Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality
- Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction
- Common knowledge of payoff uncertainty in games
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