Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.009zbMath1369.91009OpenAlexW1820309713MaRDI QIDQ893394

Assaf Romm, Mira Frick

Publication date: 19 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.009

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessrationalityincomplete informationadmissibilityapproximate common certaintycommon \(p\)-belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (1)

Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty

Cites Work

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• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Admissibility in Games

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