Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- Admissibility in Games
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- On \(p\)-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
- Proper rationalizability and backward induction
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
Cited in
(9)- Interim partially correlated rationalizability
- Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
- Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
- Optimal irrational behavior in continuous time
- Common knowledge of payoff uncertainty in games
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality
- Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria
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