Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty
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Publication:893394
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.009zbMath1369.91009OpenAlexW1820309713MaRDI QIDQ893394
Publication date: 19 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.08.009
robustnessrationalityincomplete informationadmissibilityapproximate common certaintycommon \(p\)-belief
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Cites Work
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