Common knowledge of payoff uncertainty in games
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Cites work
- A Modal Logic for Coalitional Power in Games
- Admissibility in Games
- Dominated strategies and common knowledge
- Dynamic interactive epistemology
- ERRATUM: "RATIONAL DYNAMICS AND EPISTEMIC LOGIC IN GAMES"
- Epistemic logics and their game theoretic applications: Introduction
- Games in dynamic-epistemic logic
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Interactive epistemology. I: Knowledge
- Probability logic for type spaces
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
- Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability.
- The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
- Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
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