Proper rationalizability and backward induction

DOI10.1007/s001820050128zbMath0940.91016OpenAlexW2054397416MaRDI QIDQ1961977

Frank Schuhmacher

Publication date: 30 January 2000

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050128

zbMATH Keywords

normal formbackward inductionrationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

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Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games ⋮ Fall back proper equilibrium ⋮ Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty ⋮ Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox ⋮ PERIODIC STRATEGIES: A NEW SOLUTION CONCEPT AND AN ALGORITHM FOR NONTRIVIAL STRATEGIC FORM GAMES ⋮ A game theory approach to fair and efficient resource allocation in cloud computing ⋮ Utility proportional beliefs ⋮ Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games ⋮ An algorithm for proper rationalizability ⋮ A new epistemic characterization of \(\varepsilon\)-proper rationalizability ⋮ On the beliefs off the path: equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-\(k\) ⋮ Characterizing permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility by incomplete information ⋮ Common belief in future and restricted past rationality ⋮ Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games ⋮ Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games ⋮ On the epistemic foundation for backward induction

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