Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness
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Publication:2067366
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105365zbMATH Open1481.91034arXiv2109.05145OpenAlexW3125356106MaRDI QIDQ2067366FDOQ2067366
Publication date: 18 January 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are "self-destroying" as a player's representation of the game may change after playing it once. We define discovery processes where at each state there is an extensive-form game with unawareness that together with the players' play determines the transition to possibly another extensive-form game with unawareness in which players are now aware of actions that they have discovered. A discovery process is rationalizable if players play extensive-form rationalizable strategies in each game with unawareness. We show that for any game with unawareness there is a rationalizable discovery process that leads to a self-confirming game that possesses a self-confirming equilibrium in extensive-form rationalizable conjectures. This notion of equilibrium can be interpreted as steady-state of both a discovery and learning process.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.05145
learningunawarenessextensive-form gamesself-confirming equilibriumconjectural equilibriumextensive-form rationalizability
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