Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents With Misspecified Models

DOI10.3982/ECTA12609zbMath1419.91129arXiv1411.1152MaRDI QIDQ4613417

Demian Pouzo, Ignacio Esponda

Publication date: 31 January 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1411.1152

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian learningequilibriummisspecified

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (24)

Learning with misattribution of reference dependence ⋮ Biased learning under ambiguous information ⋮ Payoff information and learning in signaling games ⋮ A reputation for honesty ⋮ Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games ⋮ Mislearning from censored data: The gambler's fallacy and other correlational mistakes in optimal‐stopping problems ⋮ Uniformly self-justified equilibria ⋮ Which misspecifications persist? ⋮ Market selection and learning under model misspecification ⋮ Nonlinear pricing, biased consumers, and regulatory policy ⋮ Making predictions based on data: holistic and atomistic procedures ⋮ A multi-agent model of misspecified learning with overconfidence ⋮ The analogical foundations of cooperation ⋮ Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs ⋮ Cheap talk with coarse understanding ⋮ Equilibrium with computationally constrained agents ⋮ Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium ⋮ Asymptotic behavior of Bayesian learners with misspecified models ⋮ Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness ⋮ Modeling players with random ``data access ⋮ Combining forecasts in the presence of ambiguity over correlation structures ⋮ Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver ⋮ Learning and self-confirming long-run biases ⋮ The possibility of Bayesian learning in repeated games

This page was built for publication: Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents With Misspecified Models